religious or cultural affiliations. 1 The move towards greater European integration is alleged to reflect this new reality. The EU may often fail to meet these emerging global challenges and cosmopolitan ideals, but for a number of its most prominent political and academic advocates it is the belief that only a body such as the EU has the potential to do so effectively that provides the best rationale for the integration process.
The empirical aspect of this way of thinking was well expressed by the then President of the European Council, Herman von Rompuy, when asked his opinion on what was at that time only a proposed referendum on Scottish independence:
Nobody has anything to gain from separatism in the world of today which, whether one likes it or not, is globalised … We have so many important challenges to take and we will only succeed if we can pool forces, join action, take common directions. The global financial crisis is hitting us hard. Climate change is threatening the planet. How can separatism help? The word of the future is union.
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In a similar vein, the philosopher Jürgen Habermas has remarked how, in his view, 'financial markets' and 'more generally, the functional systems of world society, whose influence permeates national borders, are giving rise to problems that individual states, or coalitions of states, are no longer able to master'. 3 As a result of this 'need for regulation' on a global scale, he contends 'the international community of states must develop into a cosmopolitan community of states and world citizens '. 4 As Habermas' remark indicates, the normative aspect of the integrative thesis has been considered as intimately associated with the empirical aspect. This position has also figured prominently in the discourse of EU officials. As the former President of the European Commission, José Barroso, declared in a seminar on 'Global Constitutionalism':
The present crisis has shown the limits of individual action by nation states. Europe and the principles of the Treaty need to be renewed. We need more integration, and the corollary of more integration has to be more democracy. This European renewal must represent a leap in quality and enable Europe to rise to the challenges of the world today by giving it the tools it needs to react more effectively and to shape and control the future.
5
In other words, he contends the functional need for greater integration has as its by-product a normative spill-over that allows for and requires greater democratic accountability at the European and ultimately at the global level. On this account, global problems can only be legitimately tackled by invoking global norms, that themselves imply more global legal and democratic arrangements. The EU provides the most developed example at the regional level of such a post-national arrangement.
Once again, Habermas provides a good academic example of this line of argument. He maintains the very idea of human rights involves 'an implicit claim that equal rights for everyone should be implemented on a global scale'. Moreover, this 'cosmopolitan claim' is not just a moral claim that motivates the critique of global injustice but also a legal claim for the constitutionalisation of international law, since 'human rights rely on finding institutional embodiment in a politically constituted world society'. 6 As a result, he contends that the 'sustained political fragmentation in the world and in Europe is in contradiction to the systemic growth of a global multi-cultural society'. 7 In Habermas' view, the just and effective resolution of the Euro crisis requires a move towards a new form of social and political solidarity built on a commitment to human rights and the concomitant rejection of the outmoded categories of national identity and state sovereignty that he believes block moves towards a Union based on democracy and social justice rather than the market.
Both the empirical and normative strands of these arguments for greater EU integration have undeniable force. Any empirically plausible or normatively acceptable account of politics must acknowledge both the global issues currently confronting contemporary societies and the moral responsibilities owed to non-nationals. In an increasingly interconnected world, problems such as global warming, the fair regulation of international trade and severe poverty in developing countries cannot be ignored. To the extent that many
Eurosceptic arguments appear to do so, they seem practically deficient and morally
reprehensible. Yet, it would be wrong to regard all arguments that seek to understand the EU and global governance more generally in broadly international rather than cosmopolitan terms as indifferent to either global problems or norms of global justice and human rights.
Rather, they seek to combine respect for these issues and values with forms of legal and political organisation that also give weight to some of the concerns underlying the second trend noted above, and the associated desire to retain power at, or possibly devolve it below, the level of established nation-states, rather than to transfer it to a supranational body above them.
A more sympathetic reading of this second trend notes that it too can be linked to empirical features of contemporary societies and supported by normative values of a communitarian character that reflect the self-understandings of liberal democratic states.
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From this perspective, the second trend arises from the importance of self-government among people who are mutually interdependent in a number of significant respects, share various common interests and norms, and seek to promote trust and support for collective arrangements that make sense to them as appropriate and are responsive to their interests and values. As the quotes given above illustrate, many of those who regard the EU as a necessary functional response to globalisation also contend it allows for new forms of self-government that can satisfy these demands through the democratic control of processes that increasingly operate between and across states. Yet, continuing complaints about the EU's democratic deficit indicate how difficult this contention has proven to put into practice. More importantly, it also ignores the tensions that can arise between regional integration and the historical political identities and forms of communal self-rule that have developed within each of the Member States -a tension that has become increasingly prominent in recent years.
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This chapter explores the cosmopolitan and the international routes to meeting the twin challenges thrown up by the two trends of globalisation and cosmopolitan justice, on the one hand, and the continued communitarian demands for forms of national self-determination that combine popular with polity sovereignty on the model of the nation-state, on the other. The EU is often seen as awkwardly placed between the two, its governance structures caught between representing citizens and representing states, 10 on the one hand, and developing a trans-or supranational public interest and reflecting the mutual interests of the component nation states, on the other. 11 Many supporters of European integration believe that this situation is impractical and incoherent. They contend the only plausible and justifiable solution is to resolve the second trend into the first and to make the EU the primary locus of political identity and self-determination for European citizens. 12 By contrast, I wish to suggest that these two trends can be brought together in a less reductive way that gives equal weight to each of them. I shall argue that the EU is best seen as a locus of deep cooperation between self-governing nation-states, which serves in many respects as a means of maintaining rather than replacing them in the new global context.
Two conceptual distinctions inform this analysis and are developed in the rest of this chapter. The first relates to the distinction between cosmopolitanism and communitarianism, which I link to the first and second trends respectively. Within this analysis, they represent contrasting ontological rather than ideological positions that offer different understandings of the normative and empirical basis for broadly liberal egalitarian and democratic values. I shall argue that the one favours an instrumental view of political community, the other an intrinsic view. 13 According to the first, instrumental view, both the design and competences of democratic institutions and the size and location of the political communities in which they operate should be determined by whatever scheme proves most appropriate to deliver effective and equitable policies in the most efficient manner. 14 Though some grant the modern nation-state may prove convenient for certain purposes, 15 others regard both state and popular sovereignty as undermining impartial principles of justice and favour their radical dispersal across a variety of political units. 16 Analogous reasoning informs the neofunctionalist interpretation of the integration process which underlay the Monnet method and still provides the background assumptions behind much of the Commission's thinking.
According to this thesis, the acquisition of competences by the EU induces a spill-over effect linked to functional efficacy, which both leads the EU to move into ever more related policy areas and in time encourages the shift to the European level of political institutions and ultimately people's allegiances and identities as well.
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By contrast, the second, intrinsic view, regards the good of being an equal member of a democratic polity as possessing an independent value. In such a community, citizens participate as equals in making those collective decisions in which, taken as a whole, they have an equal stake. The terms on which they participate are formally and to a degree substantively the same for all, and they treat each other as equals within the process of decision-making. Such a view of political community rests on a degree of mutual identification stemming from shared interests and values among its members, qualities that are fostered by a history of mutual interactions among them.
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If one applies this distinction to the two trends outlined above, it may be that the empirical and normative arguments made by the EU officials and philosophers cited earlier offer a case for an instrumental political community at the European level, but they fall short of justifying an intrinsic political community. That might be thought unimportant. As we saw, some cosmopolitan advocates of global justice regard such an intrinsic community as outmoded, unnecessary and in certain respects unpleasant and unjustified as well as impractical. However, the contention shall be that cosmopolitanism cannot overcome or replace the communitarian impulse, not least because reasons linked to justice and function per se underdetermine the level and membership of any political community.
The second distinction I wish to draw enters here: that between justice and legitimacy.
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Once again, I adopt a broadly liberal egalitarian conception of these concepts. In formal terms, one can define the former as giving each their due according to a given principle of justice, and the latter as indicating that institutions are recognised as rightfully ruling over those to whom they apply. While related, in that the perceived justice of a regime is likely to be a contributing factor to its legitimacy, the one cannot be regarded as providing criteria for the other. given set of policies as equitable, these accounts conclude that the available reasons will be those linked to their having participated on equal terms in a political process to determine those policies. Therefore, a legitimate state will need to sustain democratic practices. As a result, the commitment of citizens to a political community takes on an independent weightit cannot be instrumental to serving ends that it plays an intrinsic part in determining. The grounds for political community will need to be investigated in their own terms, as raising separate normative and empirical conditions to those that might justify their possible reconfiguration or collaboration to tackle issues related to globalisation and justice.
Such considerations prove crucial to any investigation of the current and prospective democratic legitimacy of the EU. They provide the ontological grounds for the 'polity' aspect of the EU, and the degree to which it can be regarded as involving an ever closer union of peoples or the formation of a European people. The rest of this chapter explores the distinctions between an instrumental and an intrinsic political community, on the one side, and between justice and legitimacy, on the other. I shall argue that the legitimacy of particular cosmopolitan conceptions of justice can only be determined by political communities with sufficient intrinsic qualities to be able to support a democratic regime. As a result, the most normatively desirable and empirically feasible way of conceiving the EU polity is in what can be called cosmopolitan communitarian terms. Such a political ontology treats the EU as a union of European peoples with a cosmopolitan regard for tackling the problems of a globalising world in ways that mutually support the capacity of these different demoi to sustain a democratic political community.
II. The Communitarian Ghost in the Cosmopolitan Machine
This section outlines more fully than above the normative and empirical strands running through the cosmopolitan and communitarian arguments. As we shall see, these two strands The standard substantive counter-argument for nationality not being morally arbitrary in determining the opportunities and resources that are open to people has been that people in national political communities have special relationships to one another that they do not have 24 eg C Beitz, 'Cosmopolitan Ideals and National Sentiment' (1983) These considerations in part motivate Pogge's well-known proposal that we should cash out the implications of cosmopolitan morality in institutional rather than interactional terms: as applying to the rules and procedures of certain institutional schemes, rather than as pertaining to the actions of individual persons and agencies. 29 He notes how the interactional case is practically weaker than the institutional in a number of respects. Take the case of rights, from which he argues. The perfect obligations necessary to uphold negative rights of non-interference can be conceptualised in global terms reasonably easily, since in principle at least they are costless and simply require individual forbearance. It is much harder to assign a global responsibility for positive rights to care and welfare that appear to rely on special obligations. Indeed, in the absence of any causal relation for the potential or actual harms involved, it is difficult even to justify positive action to secure negative rights worldwide, through the supply of peace-keeping forces and the like. The institutional view appears to fill this lacuna, since it potentially links us to a whole range of unknown others and provides a duty even to safeguard those negative rights we have not personally violated. The focus here is no longer on the direct relations between individuals, but on the justice of the practices and arrangements within which people are involved and for which they are jointly and severally responsible.
However, this institutional argument is contingent on the possible or actual existence of a global institutional scheme within which we all participate to some significant degree. Of course, there are also differences of opinion within national communities.
However, there is an overarching social context within which they can be debated. The ways we view each other as equals is a function of the character of the society and the culture in which we live, and the goods we share. 37 Therefore, the crucial factor is that we possess political equality in deciding and deliberating on the shape of that shared culture. A link is thereby established between national, popular and state sovereignty. Nationality defines a common political culture and identity that has developed historically through democratic control being tied to a state in ways that allow a people to determine for themselves the Although states do form blocs for certain limited purposes, it is also important to note that these often have the goal of preserving state autonomy rather than diminishing it. Alan
Milward's account of the former European Community as a 'rescue' of the nation-state is highly pertinent in this respect. 46 The EU emerges from this analysis as being, in part at least, a reaction against the forces of globalisation. Although the EU has drawn increasing criticism from those of a social democratic persuasion for promoting neo-liberal market policies that undermine domestic welfare and social corporatist measures, 47 it has aroused parallel criticism from neo-liberal defenders of the free market on account of the Social Chapter, environmental and similar regulation. 48 Arguably both views underestimate the EU's responsiveness to domestic political pressures in both directions, and the degree to which the core policies involving high government expenditure -social welfare provision, defence, education, culture and infrastructure -have hitherto remained outside its remit. being the source of rights, citizenship and sovereignty need to be refashioned to reflect rights. By contrast to this position, communitarians regard rights as being framed and upheld by citizenship and sovereignty. Given rights need to be interpreted and enforced, their security requires some agency that can do so in assured and impartial ways. That proves particularly true of property rights, which are partly conventional. 58 All rights but especially those property rights that are in land create the need for a territorially based sovereign power.
This power must possess a monopoly of coercive force not only within its borders but without them, in order stabilise the system of rights, including those of property ownership, and defend them against incursions from other powers.
Two consequences follow from the way sovereignty serves to define a 'polity' and the associated rights of its members. The first consequence is that so long as an individual's rights depend for their specification and protection on being subject to a territorially based sovereign political unit, then it will not be possible to fully stipulate those rights without reference to the individual's territorial affiliation in at least some instances. For example, with regard to issues of war and peace, the individual right to self-defence will be modified to involve the right to retaliate against an invading enemy army and -to the extent their activities support that army -the civilian population of an enemy. 59 Note that the liberally minded statist communitarian does not dispute that individuals are in the ultimate analysis the holders of rights, on that point they agree with cosmopolitans, merely that the holding and exercise of these rights arise in the context of a specific political unit.
The second consequence follows from the first, in that the basis, nature and limits of an individual's obligations towards this unit become a key issue from this perspective.
Communitarians contend that coercive institutions must operate on terms that make sense to those subject to them. being as much about deliberation on the common good as a mechanism for the aggregation of individual interests. They contend that for democratic processes to possess this quality they must operate among a people or demos possessing the two qualities described above. The sense of a common fate and purposes promoted by mutually beneficial reciprocal interactions help facilitate compromise and the avoidance of a purely self-regarding stance. As a result, minorities are more disposed to accept majority decisions, for example, and, perhaps most importantly, majorities to take into account the opinions and concerns of minorities rather than excluding them altogether. The crucial factor, though, comes from these collective decisions being perceived by those on all sides of the argument as somehow 'theirs' -as decisions made in common because those involved are more or less equally affected by the totality of the outcomes, if not each and every decision; draw on a common stock of norms when discussing and evaluating them, even if they disagree about their respective weighting and interpretation; and possess a degree of mutual solidarity as fellow citizens in a shared social enterprise.
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It is no accident that the two paradigmatic examples of constitution-making, namely
France and the United States in the eighteenth-century, were simultaneously instances of state-and nation-building as well. In the terminology I have been using, the polity dimensions stemming from state sovereignty and a people provided the context for establishing a regime characterised by democracy and the rule of law. Law and democracy cannot boot-strap and provide the source of their own polity conditions. They imply a people who are entitled to make and enforce decisions within a given domain. As a result, the communitarian ghost always lurks within the cosmopolitan machine.
When rights and obligations are nested within particular political communities in this way, their cosmopolitan reach will be affected. To the extent that our understanding of basic rights is coloured by the culture of our community, there are likely to be conflicts between the priorities and publicly recognised needs of different societies. State support for certain religions or languages may be important in some communities and regarded as illegitimate in others, for example. Even when the same rights are acknowledged, variations in local context may lead them to being interpreted and balanced in contrasting and not always compatible ways. In addition, there will be a feeling that 'charity begins at home' that will set limits on how much people will commit themselves to helping outsiders when that clashes with programmes, also motivated by rights considerations, of a domestic character. Thus, communitarians regard it as legitimate that a more generous national social security system, say, might be established at the cost of less spending on foreign aid overseas.
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Support for national and state sovereignty need not entail a view of international relations as an anarchic and amoral Hobbesian state of nature. Claims to self-determination for one group imply recognition of similar rights by others -including non-aggression and limited aid. 67 To the extent that global interdependence does link states within institutional networks, then they will have the sorts of obligations cosmopolitans advocate. Nonetheless, the absence of agreed metrics as to the value of resources or the relative worth of various rights and liberties will make arguments for a global redistribution of goods and services hard to cash out in practice -especially as such schemes can conflict with as well as support the autonomy of national political communities. Still, it is reasonable to suppose that globalisation will produce forms of inter-state cooperation in those areas such as defence, the environment and the economy where the capacity of states to act in autonomous ways has been seriously impaired. International law and organisations emerge from this account as an international regime that presupposes the existence of polities that have the capacity to represent and act for their peoples. The EU simply provides a particularly significant and developed form of such international cooperation. However, these cooperative schemes should be regarded as mechanisms for preserving rather than undermining national interests and self-determination, with transfers of decision-making power being largely conditional on the extent to which involvement in the relevant international body makes that possible.
III. Justice and Legitimacy
So far I have presented the two models in ways that accentuate their differences. They seem divided along two main, if related, dimensions. On the one hand, cosmopolitans argue for the global application of egalitarian theories of justice, whereas communitarians deny this possibility and insist that such theories can only apply within a political community of the kind that does not exist at the global level. On the other hand, cosmopolitans contend that international law provides the basis for a transnational democratic regime divorced from any given polity and that separates popular from state sovereignty. By contrast, communitarians contend that a democratic and legal regime is necessarily embedded within a polity that combines national and state sovereignty, and that international law is consequently inter-state rather than cosmopolitan law. As we have seen, these two models give rise in their turn to quite different images of the EU. Whereas the first suggests it provides a new kind of post-, trans-, or supranational regime without a polity, the second suggests that it must either develop polity-like characteristics or remain an essentially intergovernmental regime.
In this section, I wish to suggest that in one respect these two models are complementary and can be -indeed, need to be -combined, in ways that I shall explore in the concluding section. This complementarity arises from the two models applying different but related standards to the global order, the one stemming from justice and the other from legitimacy. Cosmopolitans tend to fold the second into the first, communitarians the first into the second. However, each requires the other. As we noted above, justice indicates the moral entitlements of individuals, and hence what they are owed by others and more especially by the political institutions to which they must submit. By contrast, legitimacy concerns not what individuals are entitled to but rather what entitles political institutions to rule or exercise power over them. These are distinct standards. Egalitarians may regard a political system, such as that of most Member States, as failing to meet certain standards of justice, falling short of their preferred criteria for establishing equal opportunity, for example, and still accept it as legitimate on other grounds.
One way of construing this distinction is to view justice and legitimacy as involving different kinds of equality of respect. 69 Justice requires that individuals are treated as substantively equal in some respect, be it with regard to access to opportunities, resources or, more minimally, and in a way that need not be egalitarian except in largely formal terms, with regard to certain basic rights. Legitimacy requires that individuals are treated as procedurally equal in some respect, maximally in each consenting to a given arrangement, more minimally in each having an equal say in influencing and accepting it. Both forms of procedural equality can be realised via some form of democratic process.
We saw how certain cosmopolitan theories treat legitimacy as a sub-category of justice. On this account, a system is legitimate to the extent that it satisfies certain minimum substantive distributive standards, including those required for the exercise of certain procedural rights. Moreover, a system becomes illegitimate to the extent democratic procedures violated these basic standards, which thereby need to be locked in through a legal constitution capable of trumping democratic decision-making. Yet treating legitimacy as a component of justice raises a number of problems. For example, how are we to distinguish those elements of justice that provide the threshold for legitimacy from those that are either unnecessary or insufficient to generate it? And does that mean that democratic decisionmaking that respects that threshold ought to be accepted as just, even if the decision itself is in other respects unjust?
Developing an argument of Jeremy Waldron, Laura Valentini has proposed a resolution of this puzzle via a distinction between the 'circumstances of justice' and the The circumstances of justice and the circumstances of legitimacy prove mutually supporting. Legitimacy entails standards of justice, yet given disagreement over these standards they likewise entail legitimacy. Or to put it in other terms, claims to substantive equality must be both raised and agreed upon within, while also being presupposed by, processes that enshrine procedural equality. If justice and, given ought implies can, feasibility provide what might be called the 'objective' normative and empirical conditions for any political arrangement, then legitimacy offers their 'subjective' normative and empirical conditions -it provides the ways these notions of justice and feasibility make sense to those to whom they apply. In the absence of any clear epistemology to ground our different ontological claims, the two must always go hand in hand. As a result, a political order must relate issues of justice and legitimacy at both the 'polity' and 'regime' dimension as is summarised in Figure 1 and empirical requirements on any political system operating in global circumstances. The latter concerns the ways in which people relate to these requirements. A corollary of this linkage is that the attempt to make cosmopolitan norms the basis of a self-validating regime operating outside any given polity will not work. A regime cannot be accepted simply because it promotes justice and efficiency because both of those issues will be in play within any decision-making process. The issue will be for whom and for which purposes are certain issues to be judged just and efficient, and by what process is agreement to be reached. As a result, cosmopolitanism cannot transcend communitarianism -rather cosmopolitanism always implies a communitarian framework within which issues of justice and legitimacy can be related. It remains to be seen how the two may come together, both in general and in the context of the EU.
IV A Cosmopolitan Communitarianism?
As we have seen, it is mistaken to regard the cosmopolitan and the communitarian arguments as totally at odds with each other, with the latter anti-liberal, anti-rights and anti-individualist, as certain commentators have claimed. 74 Rather, they offer contrasting but to some degree compatible accounts of how we should think about individuality, rights and their relationship to the political societies that embody them. My claim will be that cosmopolitan morality only makes sense to the extent that it is embedded within a communitarian framework: a position I dub cosmopolitan communitarianism.
In the last section I suggested that communitarianism supported the processes of legitimation needed to generate and justify agreement to cosmopolitan norms of justice. This argument follows from a more general point, whereby norms of justice need to be embedded in a social and moral context that reflects a web of mutual relations. As we saw, Pogge's interactional approach partly reflects this circumstance. But these interactions consist not just of shared practices but also shared understandings about the nature of those practices.
Following Michael Walzer, one can characterise the difference between the two schools of thought in terms of a distinction between 'thick' and 'thin' moralities. 75 In his terms, universal human rights represent a 'thin', `minimal' morality that all societies ought to uphold. But they do so in numerous 'thick', 'maximal' ways. Moreover, the individual rights bearers are similarly contextually defined. That is not to deny value-individualism, as is sometimes implied, but it is to reject those versions of methodological individualism that ignore the social dimension of personal identity and the development of autonomy.
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According to this thicker, more communitarian, view of rights and the individual, a pure cosmopolitanism offers an inadequate account of moral agency. For the cosmopolitan, universalist agents are supposed to act on the basis of rational considerations of pure principle that abstract from their sense of identity as persons holding certain convictions and possessing particular attachments. By contrast, the cosmopolitan communitarian believes that both the principles and the moral motivations and character of those who follow them need to be fleshed out with natural sentiments and 'thick' concepts such as courage, honesty, gratitude and benevolence that arise out of specific ways of life.
On its own, cosmopolitanism cannot generate the full range of obligations its advocates generally wish to ascribe to it. For the proper acknowledgement of 'thin' basic rights rests on their being specified and overlaid by a 'thicker' web of special obligations. determine what its precise implications or content should be, but it does provide the basis on which such determination takes place. It defines the demos, as it were, for whom a form of democratic rule appears appropriate and plausible and among whom a process giving each an equal say in overcoming their disagreements has come to be understood as both legitimate and legitimising.
Nationalism has traditionally provided the ideological glue necessary to define a relatively circumscribed group of people and unify them around a set of shared institutions and practices that were sovereign over a well-defined territory. Political loyalty, accountability and legitimacy were tied in this way to state power and authority. Indeed, humanitarian concern for others to the extent we live in a relatively 'thick' cosmopolitan civil society with a corresponding public culture.
That leaves three possibilities. We may characterise these as involving (moving anticlockwise from the bottom left, pure communitarian, box): (1) a Europe of separate, independent democratic nation-states, characterised by ethnic nationalism (or an ethnic national Europe of a similar autarchic nature vis-à-vis the rest of the world, although this is more a theoretical than a real possibility); (2) a civic European nation based around supranationalism (the communitarian cosmopolitan vision); or (3) (moving to the top left, cosmopolitan communitarian box) a civic Europe that operates as a Union of nation-states and involves a degree of variable geometry combined with a fair amount of consensus on central issues and even certain elements of a common identity.
Once again these models combine empirical and normative aspects and so can be evaluated for their plausibility and desirability. The first need not be undesirable, though there are xenophobic versions that are. It potentially allows for a degree of pluralism among states, that respects cultural differences between and self-determination within them, yet allows for global inequalities that a cosmopolitan egalitarian would deplore. Per se that need not pose a problem of justice if each of these states respects rights and democracy, substantive and procedural equality, for all their citizens along the lines defended here. The difficulty arises from the fact that this model assumes a degree of homogeneity within these states and a lack of connection between them that is implausible in today's globalised and multicultural societies. Interdependence may not have completely subverted state autonomy, as some globalists contend, but they have undeniably weakened it. Not only do the decisions of states impact on the decision-making capacity of other states in numerous ways, but also so do the transnational activities of numerous non-state actors, from organised crime to large corporations and financial institutions.
The second assumes a degree of internal cohesion and identification at the EU level - 
